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This article illustrates and formalizes the conditions under which majority voting can
lead to either delays or anticipations in public debt stabilizations. Under the assump-
tions of proportional taxation and universal public expenditures, we present an in-
tertemporal version of the \Meltzer{Richard" result, which captures the diculty of
controlling increases in public expenditures. In the benchmark model delays are en-
dogenous and have redistributive eects, but when a relatively rich minority makes the
decisions, we may observe anticipation in public debt stabilization. JEL Classication:
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Over the past century, various populist policies were adopted in several countries in Latin
America. Examples include Argentina (1946{49), Chile (1971{73), Brasil (1985{88) and
Peru (1985{88). Behind these policies lies a common factor|high income inequality|
which lead left and right wing governments to rapidly increase the size of government,
nancing public expenditures through public debt in order to attain various distributional
goals. The nal result was high in
ation and a balance of payment crisis. On the opposite
direction, some historical episodes suggest that the lack of a legislature is associated with
low public good provision. Some examples can be found in Argentina, during the military
rule (1976{83), when the access to safe water declined sharply, and in Nigeria, where
the number of children in school and the number of younger than 1 immunized against
diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus decreased signicantly between 1982{85 (Lake and Baum,
2001).
At least since Alesina and Drazen (1991) published their ndings, there has been a rich
discussion in the literature on the causes of delayed economic adjustments.1 In their in
uen-
tial article, \Why are Stabilizations Delayed?", these authors justify delayed stabilizations
over the level of debt through a \war of attrition" game between dierent socioeconomic
groups. The initial situation imposes dierent utility losses (from distortionary taxation)
across groups. The true cost is known only to each group, while the other group knows
only the distribution function of the cost. Economic reforms, including those necessary
to eliminate budget decits, in
ict costs that are unevenly distributed across society, with
the rst group to concede having to face the highest share of the burden. Delays are just
the result of each group trying to wait as long as possible, hoping that the other group
concedes rst and agrees to carry the highest share of the cost of adjustment. Drazen and
Grilli (1993) extended this idea by analyzing how a \war of attrition" can be waged in a
society that nances budget decits by issuing money.
More recently, Spolaore (2004) examined how dierent political settings result in delays
or anticipations for three types of government systems: cabinet systems, consensus systems,
and checks{and{balances systems. The majority rule, which is perhaps the most popular-
ized decision rule in political economy, dating back to Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and
Meltzer and Richard (1981), oddly seems to have been systematically left out of this eld.
In this paper we seek to correct this fault, by establishing the majority rule as the decision
rule to analyze the timing of scal stabilizations. We do this by associating delays in eco-
nomic adjustments with an increasing pattern of government expenditures over time, and
examining when and how the median voter would react to this process. Our paper also
formalizes delays and anticipations, but using information on how fundamentals such as
income distribution interact with the scal system.
1See also Drazen and Grilli (1993), Casella and Eichengreen (1996), Velasco (1998), Martinelli and
Escorza (2007) and Myatt (2005).
1Under the traditional assumptions of proportional taxation and universal expenditures,
we capture not only the patterns for delaying economic adjustments, but also the up-
ward trend in expenditures and the diculty in cutting them after each increase, the so
called \ratchet eect." Our result is driven by the redistributive aspirations of the median
voter, who delays stabilizations to transfer resources from the wealthiest individuals to the
poorest|a situation we term \redistributive delays."
Under the more general assumption that public expenditures provide uneven benets
across citizens, as in the case of targeted expenditures, the median voter may nd himself
in a position of being expropriated by the political system|a situation in which he prefers
to undertake a \preemptive anticipation." Stabilizing is the means the median voter uses
to avoid more excessive redistribution. A similar outcome holds when the preferences of
richer citizens have a greater weight in decision{making, even without targeting.2
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and describes its
particular features. Section 3 discusses delays and anticipations. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an economy where government uses its income to provide a public{nanced
good to all agents in the economy,3 with a direct impact on utility. The model is set in
continuous time. We assume no economic growth, so that income is constant through time.
2.1 Budgetary framework
Consider a small open economy which issues external debt to cover decits not covered by
revenues, and let r denote the constant world interest rate. Initially this economy has no
budget decit. If we let g(t) denote primary public spending,4 (t) the level of taxes and
b(t) the level of debt, at time t, the budget constraint up to and including moment t = 0
is given by
g(t) + rb(t) = (t); t  0 (1)
Let us assume that, at t = 0, an exogenous shock falls over the rate of growth of public
expenditures. More specically, consider that, from t = 0 until a policy change, primary
public expenditures grow at an exogenous rate 
 > 0. This setup translates government
spending into a temporal framework in a simple way, shifting the discussion from the size
of government to the date of stabilization. Besides, it connects growth in public spending
to public debt, a relationship that a static model cannot incorporate. One can consider
2A related result, although in a dierent context, can be found in Rodr guez (2004).
3For the sake of the discussion, we use public expenditure and public{nanced good interchangeably.
4To ease the exposition, we refer to primary public expenditures as public expenditures. Whenever we
wish to refer to total public expenditures (including interest payments), we emphasize it explicitly.
2that selecting the size of government every period is too costly, as it requires immediate
stabilizations which are hard to implement. Hence
g(t) = g(0)e
t; t 2 [0;T)
where T is the date of the policy change. Assume also that this increase in public spending
is only partially re
ected in taxes
(t) = (0) + [g(t) + rb(t)   (0)]; t 2 [0;T); with  2 [0;1) (2)
where 1    is the fraction of the increase in total expenditures nanced by issuing debt
(decit bias). Hence, between t = 0 until an economic adjustment, the level of debt evolves
according to
_ b(t) = g(t) + rb(t)   (t) = (1   )[g(t) + rb(t)   (0)]; t 2 [0;T) (3)
Let us assume that 
 6= r(1   ). Then, equation (3) may be solved to yield5
b(t) = b(0)er(1 )t + (1   )[g(0)(t;







   r(1   )]
Equation (4) states that the level of debt at moment t is the sum of the debt at moment
0 with the overall impact of the accumulated decits between moment 0 and t, including
interest payments. The term (t;
;r;) measures the present value factor of the impact of
a variable growing at rate 
, given a discount rate r and a decit bias 1 , in the level of
debt at time t.
A stabilization in this setup consists of setting the growth rate of public spending
equal to zero, plus an increase in taxes that prevents further growth in the level of debt.
Therefore, taxes from the date of stabilization T onwards are
(t) = g(T) + rb(T); t 2 [T;+1) (5)
where g(T) = g(0)e
T, and where b(T) is given by equation (4) evaluated at t = T, i.e.,
the debt accumulated between 0 and T. Hence, _ b(t) = 0; 8t  T.
Notice that public spending grows exponentially from t = 0 until a policy change, but
remains constant thereafter, while taxes cover this increase only partially, but face a one{
time jump at t = T in order to achieve budget balance thereafter. The level of debt is
increasing from time zero until the date of stabilization, but remains constant thereafter.
5If 
 = r(1   ), the dierential equation would change, but all results presented here remain valid.
32.2 Individual decision{making
Let us now introduce heterogeneous agents and analyze the date of stabilization preferred
by each individual. We consider the economy to be populated by a continuum of citizens
with mass of unity. Each citizen, indexed by i, is characterized by his|exogenous, constant




, which is drawn from a cumulative distribution
Fy(y), according to a density function fy(y). This p.d.f. is assumed to be single{peaked
and skewed to the right, such that ymed < E(y), where ymed is the median income and E()
denotes the expected value operator. Also, dene {i = yi=E(y) as the relative income of
citizen i, and interpret {med = ymed=E(y) as a measure of inequality in income distribution
in the society: the higher is {med, the more equally is income distributed.
Letting  denote the public good preference parameter, and dening ci(t) as the con-
sumption at moment t, the 
ow utility of agent i at time t, denoted by ui(t), is








> 0 and v00 
g(t)







denote the lifetime utility of
agent i, where cD
i (t) is the consumption path before stabilization and cR
i (t) is the consump-
tion after the reform package has been adopted. Assume, for simplicity, that the discount
rate of an individual equals the interest rate.7 Then her lifetime utility, if a stabilization




























As usual in the literature, we assume that each individual faces a proportional tax rate.
In particular, an individual in this economy pays taxes totaling (t)  yi, where (t) is the
tax rate, assumed to be equal for all citizens. One could consider distortionary taxation
 a la Barro, but our main conclusions carry through to this case.8 The individual budget



































= 0. Linearity in consumption is
used for analytical tractability. Subtracting yi in the utility function was rst suggested in Alesina and
Drazen (1991), and constitutes a simple normalization that does not aect any conclusions. Its role will
become apparent in the sequel.
7This assumption is standard in the economics literature.
8Our working paper provides a more extensive discussion of this issue.
4while total tax income in the economy at time t is
(t) = (t) 
Z
yfy(y)dy = (t)  E(y)
which implies that the tax rate at each moment in time is simply (t) = (t)=E(y). The




E(y) ;t 2 [0;T)
g(T)+rb(T)
E(y) ;t  T
(8)


































Plugging (9) into (6) we can obtain the indirect lifetime utility of agent i as a function of



































where we choose not to substitute b(t) and b(T) for their expressions, so that the equation
does not become too cumbersome. Notice that subtracting yi in the 
ow utility was just a
simplication, which becomes advantageous here.
3 Delays or anticipations
3.1 Individual i's desired policy
The preferred date of stabilization of an individual with income yi is found by maximizing
(10) with respect to T, subject to the condition T  0.9 The result can be summarized as




> g(0) is satised. This assumption implies that
any citizen with an income equal to or below per capita income ({i  1) does not want to undertake an
immediate stabilization.
5follows.10











; if v0 1( 1  {i) > g(0)
0 ; otherwise
(11)





















The left{hand side is the net marginal benet of delaying the stabilization another instant,
evaluated at T
i , for citizen i. Hence, agent i would prefer to stabilize when the gain gen-
erated by the increase in government expenditures for him is exactly oset by the increase
in taxes he faces to nance the higher level of primary government spending originated
by delaying the stabilization another instant.11 Notice that neither the level of debt nor
the fraction of the increase in total government expenditures that is nanced with decits
before the stabilization (that is 1 ) have any impact on T
i . In fact, delaying the adjust-
ment another instant implies an increase in the interest over that period, which has to be
paid later on. As the benets and costs of this process are exactly equal, they cancel each
other out. Observe that while the gain from delaying stabilizations is equal for all citizens,
the increase in the amount of taxes each agent faces depends on the relative income. This
implies that poor agents desire to stabilize later, as they face a lower incentive to support
stabilizations. Table 1 summarizes this and other eects of parameters over the preferred
time for stabilization T
i when (11) does not yield a corner solution.
Table 1: The eects of parameters over the preferred time for stabilization




   The desired level of expenditures is attained sooner
Initial value of
public expenditures
g(0)   Initially, expenditures are closer to the desired level
Relative income {i   Agent pays more taxes for a given stabilization date
Preference for public
expenditures
 + The weight of public expenditures in utility increases
10All proofs are relegated to the appendix.






























The eect mentioned in the text concerns only the rst term. Taxes will also increase to pay for the interest
associated with the enlargement of the level of debt arising from this delay.
63.2 The benevolent social planner's preferred policy
We now turn to the preferred date of stabilization for a benevolent social planner. We
consider a utilitarian social welfare function, a very common and standard approach in
the literature to dene optimal solution concepts.12 If we assume that the social planner's





U(T)fy(y)dy; s.t. T  0
The result is summarized in the following proposition.



































Hence, it is optimal for the social planner to stabilize when the gain generated by the
increase in government expenditures for the society from delaying the stabilization is exactly
oset by the increase in taxes the society has to pay in order to nance the higher level
of public expenditures if it were to delay the stabilization another instant. Notice that
while the social planner considers the same gain from delays as any other citizen (since
the benet from public expenditures does not vary across citizens), he takes into account
only the average cost of this process in his decision{making, and not any specic cost
for any individual. Importantly, he does not necessarily consider the cost of delaying the
stabilization for the median voter.
3.3 Policy{makers, delays and anticipations
3.3.1 The median policy{maker and redistributive delays
Clearly, the lower the relative income of the policy{maker, the larger the stabilization
date and the more overwhelmed the government will be. In what follows, we allow this
decision{maker to be selected by majority voting.
12Notice that the application of a utilitarian objective function is not very restrictive when used in
conjunction with quasi{linear preferences, since these rule out distributional considerations (see Persson
and Tabellini, 2000).
7We immediately see that unidimensionality and single{peakedness of preferences is ver-
ied. Hence, a Condorcet winner always exists. Under majority voting, the timing of












which is positive. Thus, stabilizations are postponed beyond what is optimal. The delay












which is always strictly greater than zero when the decision{maker is the median voter.
Recall that, as {med < 1, the median voter is contributing less to nance public goods
than the society. That is, all citizens have the same benet from public goods, but those
individuals whose income is less than or equal to the median face a lower cost of pro-
vision of these goods. Therefore, all of these citizens, who constitute a majority, vote
for delaying stabilizations, thereby increasing government expenditures above the optimal
level, and indirectly transferring resources from the richest individuals straight to them|A
\redistributive delay."13 In other words, the median voter has few resources to spend in
consumption and nds in delays a way to increase his utility at the expense of the wealthiest
citizens, who will bear a larger fraction of the burden later on. The richest individuals are
therefore expropriated by the political system. Moreover, the lower is the median voter's
income, the lower is the cost of providing public goods according to his perspective, and so
the greater the delay lag and the expropriation faced by high income classes.
Once the stabilization is achieved, public expenditures tend to remain constant, but at a
higher level than what would be optimal. This result can be interpreted as an intertemporal
version of the \Meltzer{Richard result" (Meltzer and Richard, 1981, 1983). It also mimics
the the so-called \ratchet eect," the upward trend in public spending and the diculty in
cutting public expenditures that characterize many countries.
3.3.2 The wealthy policy{maker and preemptive anticipations
Let us now consider the case of a policy{maker whose preferences are in accordance with
the fraction M of the richest citizens, where M is small. In particular, suppose that
the relevant income for this policy{maker is not the median income, but an income of
13Notice that here, as in Alesina and Drazen (1991), as time passes the amount of redistribution increases.












which is clearly negative. As compared to the optimal policy, this policy{maker anticipates
the date of stabilization, in a clear attempt to reduce the size of government and to avoid
being expropriated by the poor, who would like a larger government, since they carry a
smaller fraction of the total tax burden. In other words, the wealthy policy{maker, when
in power, preempts redistribution by anticipating a stabilization relative to the decision a
benevolent social planner would make.
3.3.3 The median policy-maker and preemptive anticipations
A result similar to the previous one can be obtained when the decision is carried out by the
median voter, but a large fraction of public expenditures is targeted to a share X < 0:5 of
the poorest citizens. To see this, suppose that, besides providing a universal public good,
gu(t), the government implements a targeted welfare program, gtg(t). The latter allows a
higher consumption to poorest citizens. For simplicity, assume that the welfare program
consists of uniform lump-sum transfers to all citizens whose income is equal to or below a
given threshold level, e y, e y < ymed. Letting e x denote the measure of all eligible citizens, each
eligible citizen receives a lump-sum transfer of gi
tg(t) = gtg(t)=e x. Both types of expenditures
are nanced by proportional taxation. Also, let g(t) = gu(t) + gtg(t); 8t, and assume that
from t = 0 until a policy change, both types of expenditures grow at the same rate 
 > 0,
but remain constant thereafter.15 In this case, the indirect lifetime utility of agent i as a






























tg(t) takes the value of gtg(t)=e x if yi < e y and 0 otherwise.
Using the same steps as in the benchmark model, and noting that the median voter























 0, otherwise, the delay lag would be
 T

opt. The analysis, however, remains unchanged under this alternative scenario.
15We recognize that a more general model should consider the choice between universal and targeted
expenditures as endogenous, but for our purpose it is enough to introduce concerns over social inequality
through exogenous targeted expenditures.
9where e gu(0) = gu(0)=g(0). In this case, T
opt does not depend on the level of targeted
expenditures|a consequence of the utilitarian approach. However, the level of targeted
expenditures is relevant for the median voter, as he has to pay for them and does not receive
any compensation in return. The highest the initial share of targeted relative to universal
expenditures, the sooner the median voter stabilizes, in order to limit redistribution to the
poor. Therefore, if the ratio of targeted to universal expenditures is suciently high, the
median voter votes alongside the wealthiest citizens in order to avoid being expropriated
by the poor, preempting redistribution.16
4 Concluding remarks
This paper brings the majority rule into the realm of economic adjustments and shows
that both delays and anticipations may occur|relative to the optimal date of stabilization
chosen by a benevolent social planner. Under proportional taxation and universal public
expenditures, a modied intertemporal version of the \Meltzer{Richard mechanism" is
present in the political equilibrium, resulting in a \redistributive delay." However, under
the more realistic specication where the benet from public services is concentrated in
the poor or the decision power is concentrated among the rich, a \preemptive anticipation"
occurs.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
The problem to solve is
max
T
Ui(T); s.t. T  0
where Ui(T) is dened in equation (10). Plugging in the expressions for g(t), b(t) and b(T),
using the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus and Leibniz's rule, and after some tedious





















 0 yields the desired solution. To prove that T
i is
the unique maximizer, it is enough to show that the utility function is strictly quasiconcave,
which is straightforward.
11Proof of proposition 2
Noting that
R
































s.t. T  0
The proof follows exactly the same steps as in proposition one. Our assumption in footnote
9 rules out a corner solution. g(T
opt) can be obtained by re-arranging equation (12), after
observing that g(T) = g(0)  e
T.
12